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DARYL LIM: Welcome everybody. In these strange times, it's always
difficult to say good morning or good afternoon but wherever you are welcome.
This is the session that is always a little bit of an outlier but one that has always
been important and perhaps more than ever is one that IP lawyers should be
thinking about. We're very pleased to have with us a group of distinguished
panelists, which I'll be introducing momentarily. Just a couple of words about
the format. It's going to be pure discussion. We have 60 minutes between us,
and we invite the audience to feed us your questions. Whenever you think that
you have a question, and we'll get to them not necessarily at the end but even in
between if there's an appropriate juncture. With us today we have– I'll just go
in the order that you appear in the program.
1
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Damien Geradin from Geradin Partners, Brussels. Bill Kovacic at GW
and former chair of the FTC 1. Tom Nachbar from the University of Virginia.
Thibault Schrepel, Utrecht and Stanford. We have Charlotte Slaiman from
Public Knowledge and Angela Zhang from HKU. Welcome, everybody. Just
before we started, we were musing about war and peace and I thought that might
actually be quite an appropriate way to think about where we are with antitrust
law. We're going to be talking about two big themes today: digital platforms
and artificial intelligence. In a way, it not just bridges the session that we've had
before but the session that will come afterwards. It also, I think, fits very nicely
into an international IP conference like this because the very nature of what
we'll be discussing transcends borders.
Let's start with the question of digital platforms and in particular, the
issue of consumer welfare. Consumer welfare is for those of you unfamiliar with
the doctrines in antitrust law really is the cornerstone of what drives a lot of
what happens in antitrust law but what is consumer welfare and how should we
think about it in this brave new world of digital platforms? Let's start with Tom.
THOMAS B. NACHBAR: Oh, well, thanks so much, and thanks for
having me today. I'm really looking forward to this conversation and I'm excited
by the discussion format because what I have to say about consumer welfare is
to some extent a question. Consumer welfare is being held up today I think as
an impediment really to a lot of antitrust reform. This idea for those who are
unfamiliar with it we I’ll lay it out a little bit but its place in modern antitrust
law is largely attributed to Robert Bork and his book The Antitrust Paradox.2 I
kind of have a view on what consumer welfare is but what's most interesting to
me about consumer welfare is I think it's become or the consumer welfare
standard in antitrust I think is that it's become a placeholder. It's become a
placeholder both for I think a set of policies or a set of approaches that courts
take.
It's also become a placeholder for an impediment to a set of policies or
a set of positions that courts might take. I was actually hoping to open the
discussion a little bit to how the other panelists perceived the consumer welfare
standard. I'm familiar with some of your all's work so I know where some of
you are coming from on this, but I think it might be helpful to talk about it a
little bit. To get this started, my own view on consumer welfare is that or the
standard I should say is that it basically requires those who would invoke the
antitrust law to explain how a particular restraint or practice has an effect on
consumers. At the time that it was really first or pushed in its modern form that
was in response to a set of antitrust standards that really emphasized more
heavily the role of competitors in the sort of antitrust ecosystem. I'm curious to
hear how others think about the consumer welfare standard and how much work
they think that it's doing in today's antitrust debates in specifically with regard
to platforms. I don't know–
DARYL LIM: Tom, why don't you pick someone?
THOMAS B. NACHBAR: Why? I was going to say I didn't want to have
to–
DARYL LIM: You should be well versed as a professor.

1
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THOMAS B. NACHBAR: At picking someone? Bill, what do you think
about consumer welfare? I'm going to pick someone who's easy because I
already have some sense of Bill's views on consumer welfare.
WILLIAM E. KOVACIC: Thank you, Tom and thank you, Daryl, and
most of all Hugh for the wonderful opportunity to participate in the discussion.
I can't say enough about what Hugh has done in building a forum over the
decades for conversation and discussion. I admire him so much for doing it. I
think a difficulty in the modern debate is that consumer welfare carries a lot of
baggage with it. It is a beguiling phrase which was deliberately chosen for its
facial attractiveness but everything depends on what it means. I can give you a
sense of what I think it has not meant in practice. It has not meant a singleminded focus on price and output effects.
There've been so many instances in the last 40 years in which
competition agencies and courts have given effect to innovation-related
concerns, for example, and indeed at times have taken into account distortions
in labor markets that would ultimately affect consumers. I suspect a further
difficulty here is that it is associated in modern discourse so completely with
the views of Robert Bork and the Chicago school that it obscures other forces
at the time that are focused attention on the consumer interests. Ralph Nader's
group in the early 1970s said again and again that competition law should take
into account consumer interests. Everything depends, as Tom was saying, on
how we define the term.
I would certainly think that if you looked at what agencies have done
and what courts have done, the concept as a goal, a focal point for enforcement
has to encompass the interests of consumers in innovative markets in qualityprice effects to be sure but also all other market distortions that ultimately
undermine the consumer interest. I think that one thing that does stand out
though is that in the modern debate, those who call for a transformation of the
system want that view of competition, want to be repudiated completely.
A telling example is the House Majority Staff Report3 prepared under
the aegis of the House Subcommittee on Antitrust in the Senate Judiciary
Committee. It has a paragraph that says we want a broader concept known as
basically citizen welfare that looks at the interests of individuals, not just as
buyers of goods and services, but as residents of local communities.4 As
entrepreneurs, as employees, in small and medium enterprises with a stake in
decentralization of authority as a means of preserving democracy itself. That
would bring us back in many ways to a more egalitarian view expressed in
Supreme Court decisions in particulargv in merger cases in the 1960s that would
change the focus of what we do.
I feel a disappointment in the modern debate that consumer welfare is so
often associated just with price and output effects. I don't think that's what's
happened but the critics have even a broader conception would certainly take us
to a much greater concern with the disappearance of individual entrepreneurs
perhaps in the view that in the long term that hurts consumers as well.
DARYL LIM: All right. Thanks, Bill. Now, let's segue that to what does
consumer welfare mean in terms of understanding what's going on with
digital platforms, and Bill I think alluded to that when he talked about
3

SUBCOMM. ON ANTITRUST, COMM. AND ADMIN. LAW OF THE COMM.
JUDICIARY, INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION IN DIGITAL MARKETS (2020).
4
Id. at 391.
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the report, but let's bring that front and center. How does consumer
welfare inform your view of what should be done with digital platforms,
if at all?
THOMAS B. NACHBAR: Darryl, is that open to the panel as all?
DARYL LIM: Yes, it is.
CHARLOTTE SLAIMAN: I think it's important to bring in here how
the consumer welfare standard has figured into, in particular, the Facebook case
that the FTC has brought against Facebook for their alleged antitrust violations. 5
I agree with Bill's description of the consumer welfare standard. In reality, it is
not limited to consumer prices– it is supposed to include innovation. It is
supposed to include product quality but I think there is a lot of truth to the
concerns that the courts have been overly focused on consumer prices.
Whether that is due to the consumer welfare standard or whether that is due to
the fact that it's easier to do this complex economic modeling that we've become
so reliant on when you're looking at consumer prices than innovation.
Innovation can be really hard to quantify but it's so, so important. We saw
Facebook in their motion to dismiss to the FTC case, arguing that because their
product is free to consumers, that they can't be monopolizing. 6
I think that I sure hope that the court does not adopt that position. The
FTC was very clear that non-price markets can still be subject to the antitrust
laws. There are real quality concerns that we have about Facebook's product or
consumers may be paying with their data and their attention. These products are
not really free. Seeing that argument in such an important forum is concerning
and I want to make sure that, that sort of confusion is not taking root. I do think
this is one of the areas that Congress should be looking at, for reforming the
antitrust laws.
DARYL LIM: Charlotte, let me follow up on with a couple of questions.
When you talk about data and product quality, what is the harm to consumers?
CHARLOTTE SLAIMAN: Yes. I think if consumers really had choice,
if Facebook was pushed by competition to be more clear about how they are
treating users' data, we would have better privacy on Facebook. Instead,
people's data is being used in ways that they are not aware of. Then, when they
find out, they are really not happy about it. There have been some high-profile,
particular scandals but even just the day-to-day use of the data to target ads in
what appear to be very effective and manipulative ways. I think there's still some
empirical question about how effective targeted ads really are?
I think in a competitive environment, where companies really were clear
about what their privacy policies were in a way that consumers could actually
understand, there would be a higher quality product. There would be better
privacy and there isn't. I think that's because of the lack of competition.
DARYL LIM: All right. Next, I want you to comment on something that
Bill mentioned, which is citizen welfare. Is what you're advocating more like
citizen welfare than what we have traditionally thought of as consumer welfare?
CHARLOTTE SLAIMAN: I don't think we need to go that far in order
to make real improvements here. I think reiterating the importance of these other
Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Facebook, Inc., No. CV-3590 (JEB), 2021 WL 2643627
(D.D.C. June 28, 2021).
6
Memorandum in Support of Facebook, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss FTC’s Complaint at
2, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Facebook, Inc., No. CV-3590 (JEB), 2021 WL 2643627 (D.D.C. June
28, 2021).
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categories that I think are already part of consumer welfare. Innovation, in
particular. Bill mentioned that there have been cases brought about innovation
harms, and I think that's right. I can't think of cases that have been only about
innovation. I'm confident that Bill knows a lot better than I do. Maybe you know
some cases. I can't think of any cases that have been only about innovation.
Innovation is often a part of the case that also has price effects or also has quality
effects. I do think innovation is being left out. One of the legislative proposals
in Congress that I've been really impressed with is Senator Klobuchar's antitrust
reform package7 that was introduced this Congress. It is more about changing
presumptions, to make it easier for enforcers to bring a case. I think that's the
way forward.
DARYL LIM: We're going to talk about the Klobuchar bill in just a
moment, but I want to invite the panelists just weigh in if you have any thoughts
on what's been said so far.
DAMIEN GERADIN: What I wanted to say is that I think this consumer
welfare debate is very much an American one. We've seen the focus of a lot of
discussion in the US. In Europe, we hardly speak about it, especially when it
comes to platforms. I think that we understand consumer welfare as very broad
in nature. Not at all, only concerned with prices. I think that it's really, I wouldn't
say it's a non-issue, because it comes from time to time in discussions. But those
in favor of more antitrust enforcement with respect to platforms do not consider
the consumer welfare standard has been an obstacle of any kind. I think we've
got other issues but not this one.
DARYL LIM: Follow up to that, Damien. To what extent do you think
this dichotomy–if you like– the tension that we see in the US is a product of the
legacy of the Chicago School? How that perhaps has not been quite as evident
in places like Europe?
DAMIEN GERADIN: Yes, that's perhaps the case. I think Europe is
different in the sense that we've had quite a lot of antitrust enforcement.
Especially when it comes to abuse of a dominant position, there have been
multiple cases. Whereas in the United States, if you look at it, there hasn't been
much since Microsoft. Is it because the focus is on consumer welfare or on
excessively narrow issues? Perhaps. When I read some decisions, American
decisions such as for example, the Court of Appeals decision in FTC versus
Qualcomm,8 I tend to think we operate in different worlds in many ways.
I think that competition law is broader in Europe, definitely when it comes to
single-firm conduct. Perhaps, it's still the influence of the Chicago School that
is stronger in the US. I don't know but definitely in Europe, there has been more
enforcement. As I will say in a moment when we turn to Europe, a lot of
unsuccessful enforcement's as well in the sense that we have infringement
decisions but in practice they haven't changed anything at all. This is why we're
moving away from antitrust, not because it's too narrow but because it's largely
ineffective to deal with platforms. We're moving to regulation by and large.
DARYL LIM: All right. Thanks, Damien. Angela?
ANGELA ZHANG: We in China have been watching this debate in the
United States about consumer welfare and have asked, what is the proper
standard to use? I actually watch with trepidation from a Chinese perspective
7
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because as you know in China, the antitrust enforcement is seldom subject to
judicial reveal. Everything is internalized. When I'm talking about
administrative enforcement, it's internalized within the bureaucracy already.
Now, if you change the consumer welfare model, which was originally based
on price effects, to some other standard which seems more elastic and more
open-ended, and more flexible for the agency to use, I'm just concerned about
this kind of abuse of administrative power in the Chinese context because at
least right now we have something to start with, to start assessing. And so that
companies have an idea when they ask, “How do I do compliance?” Once you
completely shift the model, then the whole thing becomes very arbitrary. I do
share sympathy with the concern that our distinguished panelists have with
regard to Big Tech, and in China, we face very similar issues as well.
DARYL LIM: A little bit more though since we have you on the
spotlight, tell us about why is it that all of a sudden you see vigorous
enforcement action against its own homegrown tech giants and what is it really
concerned about, the Chinese government?
ANGELA ZHANG: For those of you who follow what's going on in
China, it all started from a controversial speech that Jack Ma made back in
October last year 9 in Shanghai in which he made some remarks that criticized
Chinese financial regulation which directly, irked some of the top leadership in
China. As a result, you saw a sudden change in attitude toward Big Tech since
that speech. Ant Group, which was the world's largest FinTech company, which
was supposed to launch the largest IPO10 ever, actually had to suspend its IPO
at the very last minute. Then, the Chinese financial regulators also issued new
draft rules, tightening FinTech regulation in China. 11
Then you saw the antitrust regulator, jump onto the bandwagon and
start tightening regulation by issuing draft guidelines and tackling the platforms
followed by investigation into Alibaba. I believe the recent trigger of this
scrutiny has to do with this kind of policy shift directed from the top leadership.
This is something very different from what you’d have observed before because
before it had mostly been driven by bottom-up efforts, but now this is the first
time I observed a very clear policy signal from Beijing to exert greater control
over this area. Obviously from the standpoint of an antitrust regulator, they see
this as a very exciting opportunity to step out into the policy limelight.
As you know, since 2016, Chinese antitrust has been relatively quiet and
we don't often see any very big cases like Qualcomm. It's not because we
haven’t had issues before. There have been continuous complaints about the
exclusionary conduct in other tech firms like Alibaba and Tencent, but there
have not been any penalty decisions imposed on these companies. One
important reason has to do with the fact that, as this antitrust agency is an agency
within the larger ministry, it is subject to a lot of bureaucratic constraints, and it
wasn't sure at the time where to stand in terms of regulating the Chinese
domestic tech giants.
9

Jack Ma, Bund Finance Summit Speech (Oct. 24, 2020) (translated transcript
available at https://interconnected.blog/jack-ma-bund-finance-summit-speech/).
10
Initial public offering.
11

Guānyú píngtái jīngjì lǐngyù de fǎn lǒngduàn zhǐnán (zhēngqiú yìjiàn gǎo) (关于平

台经济领域的反垄断指南（征求意见稿）) [Antitrust Guidelines on the Platform Economy
(Draft for Comments)] (promulgated by the State Admin. for Mkt. Regulation, Nov. 20, 2020,
available at http://www.samr.gov.cn/hd/zjdc/202011/t20201109_323234.html).
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If we are thinking about technical nationalism, why would you use your
own antitrust law to crack down on your own most innovative firms? That
explains why the antitrust regulator has been quite tolerant and cautious in
dealing with these issues. They're trying to apply other more lenient tools, like,
the Anti-unfair Competition Law or the E-commerce Law to deal with some of
these cases.
DARYL LIM: Help us to understand, in terms of predicting what's to
come, should they look at [inaudible] this is how they're going to apply the
Chinese Competition Laws. Should they look at the US model or is the Chinese
government really creating its own path?
ANGELA ZHANG: I think the Chinese government is definitely
exceptional in this, regardless. No way they're going to follow the EU or the US
model given the fact, as we just talked about, that there are not Western checks
and balances in China, but rather there is a Chinese style of checks and balances
which is something I've been writing about in my book, and more generally,
about this power fragmentation in China, where you see many different agencies
having overlapping responsibilities over these platform businesses.
Now the question becomes should we use Antitrust Law to deal with this
problem, should we use financial regulation, and what about data privacy? I
think, there are many different moving pieces right now that concern the
regulation of Big Tech. I believe these bureaucratic politics will continue to play
out and affect the ongoing regulation of big tech in China.
DARYL LIM: Thanks, Angela. I know Thibault had a comment and
then we'll go to Damien. Thibault.
THIBAULT SCHREPEL: It seems to me that when it comes to the
debate regarding the consumer welfare standards, in the US it's very much
market-based even when you hear in the reports sent to the Congress that's Big
Tech is bad for the press and in the media, it's always taking market metrics
saying it's bad because look at the advertisement revenues and so on. In Europe,
what we have is that we very much have a discussion, which is market versus
non-market, good for the market versus bad for the environment. That's
something which is potentially a bit different.
When it comes to within the market and the consumer, it's true that in
Europe, we see that consumer welfare isn't always about prices, but I think we
have to understand the tech and the business model a bit better because when I
read in the European Commission decision that reduction of choice always
equals a reduction of consumer welfare, I think this isn't true. We have a lot of
behavioral studies showing that a certain type of reduction may actually be good
for consumers meaning that the question in my view should be when the big
tech companies reducing choice are they doing that in a way, which is good for
consumers, which is the possibility or are they doing that in a way, which is
good for them? If you simply say less choice equals bad for consumer you never
get to ask the right question, which is why I think the Google case is so
problematic while again, the practice may very much be anti-competitive.12
DARYL LIM: By the way, Thibault, what do you think of Trinko?13
THIBAULT SCHREPEL: Of the Trinko case in the US?
12

Summary of Commission Decision of 27 June 2017 Relating to a Proceeding under
Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 54 of the EEA
Agreement (Case AT.39740 — Google Search (Shopping)), 2018 O.J. (C 9).
13
Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. L. Offs. of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
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DARYL LIM: Yes. It also echoes exactly what you're saying.
THIBAULT SCHREPEL: Well, yes, it's a long discussion, but when it
comes especially to choice reduction in that case. Well, I know everything you
say but Trinko might be controversial. Overall, I think it's pretty much a good
decision for the reason that I just explained. I see some other issues in the case
that we could be discussing as well.
DARYL LIM: All right. Thanks, Thibault. Bill.
WILLIAM E. KOVACIC: Daryl, could I make one comment on the
implication of the developments that Angela just referred to? That is, I see a
tremendous amount of pressure building on the new leadership of the US
agencies, both the acting chairwoman Rebecca Kelly Slaughter and the person
to be named for the Department of Justice, a tremendous amount of pressure to
reformulate the goals of the US system. I think it means that they will no longer
be outwardly speaking about consumer welfare because it does have so much
fright attached to it. I think they're going to be speaking in broader pluralistic
terms about goals.
In particular, I would predict by the end of the year, the US will start
going on a global apology tour, basically, to say for the last 40 years, we have
misled you by our own formulation of what we think the purposes of the
antitrust laws are and we will be the last to tell you that your own distinctive
views about what you should do is improper. In short, do what you want and do
a lot of it.
DARYL LIM: We're going to come back to what antitrust is going to
look like in the Biden administration in just a moment. Damien, I want to give
you a chance to weigh in, and then we'll get to the point that Charlotte mentioned
earlier about the Klobuchar Bill which actually ties in with the antitrust reform
that Bill was talking about. Damien.
DAMIEN GERADIN: Perhaps just to respond to Bill. In fact, I think
people will not care very much about that global tour because when I started 30
years ago, we were all looking at the US and we were using US case books and
reading US cases and the main antitrust scholars were all American. It has
changed. I think that unfortunately, or fortunately–who knows, it depends on
your viewpoints–US antitrust has become largely irrelevant as a global
standard. I think that the European model has become more prominent and I
think it's not necessarily because it's better, but simply because it's more
adaptable.
An agency-based model which is more interventionist in nature is
probably more attractive to many nations than the US system, which is more
litigation-based. Anyway, it's a bit of a digression. Now let's speak about digital
platforms and what's happening in Europe. Well, I think that unlike in the
United States for the past 15 to 20 years, we've had a lot of antitrust enforcement
when it comes to digital platforms, starting with Microsoft in the 1990s, which
led to the famous decision adopted from 2003,14 and since then it never really
stopped. We've had three Google investigations with three infringement
decision15 and fines. There's still a couple of Google investigations pending.
We've got an investigation against Apple, we've got two against Amazon, one
14

Commission Decision, 2004 O.J. (L 32) 23.
Summary of Commission Decision of 27 June 2017, 2018 O.J. (C 9) 11; Summary
of Commission Decision of 18 July 2018, 2019 O.J. (C 402) 19; Summary of Commission
Decision of 20 March 2019, 2020 O.J. (C 369) 6.
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against Facebook. I'm just mentioning the EU level. I'm not mentioning the
member states, because if you add the member states you can probably add
another 10 to 15 investigations against the big platforms.
All these investigations and decisions essentially follow the same model,
which is one of so-called vertical leveraging, which is that the theory of harm is
that you've got a platform which is dominant on an upstream market. It can be
Search, it can be the App Store, it can be whatever, and it will leverage its
market power upstream in order to distort competition downstream. This is, for
example, the claim made by Spotify in its complaint against Apple, which is
that Apple would be using its control of the App Store to distort competition on
the downstream market for music streaming. That's basically the main theory of
harm.
Now, what is not so well-known is that despite all this enforcement
there's a general view in the EU that antitrust enforcement has been unsuccessful
to tame the platforms. In particular, the two main Google decisions, which are
the Shopping decision16 and the Android decision,17 didn't do very much. They
achieved very little because the remedies were weak and not very well enforced.
Therefore, I think there is a growing consensus that antitrust is not the right tool
if you want more competition in digital markets.
One other thing that is often referred to is that competition or
investigations are very slow. They're slow for obvious reasons, which is that
you have to do a number of things in order to establish an infringement; which
is to define markets, to establish dominance, to do an effects-based analysis to
look at possible objective justification. This takes a lot of time. This is very
complicated, and therefore it might not be the right tool if you need a quick
remedy to a problem. In the past few years, the thinking has shifted towards
adopting what we call often ex ante legislation, which would be a regulatory
framework that would apply before the harm is created; that's why it's called ex
ante.
We've got two major proposals: one in the EU, the other one in the UK.
The one in the EU is the proposal for Digital Markets Act18 or DMA proposal,
and there are three main pillars in that proposal. One is that it would apply only
to designated gatekeepers. There are a certain number of criteria for a
gatekeeper to be designated, essentially quantitative criteria, although it's a
presumption-based system, so even if you meet the quantitative criteria you can
still try to prove that in fact, you're not a gatekeeper.
Then there would be a list of 18 obligations that designated gatekeepers
would have to comply with. Many of them find their root in competition cases
such as, for example, self-referencing, some form of tying, and so on and so
forth. Then there's a centralized enforcement system, in that it would be the
European Commission that would designate the gatekeepers, and if the
gatekeepers do not stick to their obligations, would basically go after them.
That's the European model. It's an intellectual revolution in the sense
that it's not competition law. It's not intended to be competition law because the
idea is basically to make things simpler in the sense that you don't have to define
16
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markets, show dominance. The criteria are different. There's no reference to
consumer welfare. The Commission doesn't have to do an ethics-based analysis,
so we switch for a regulatory framework than any sort of competition
framework. Now we can discuss whether or not it's a good idea. I just wanted
to point out that this is, of course, very different from competition law. Perhaps
it belongs to competition policy, but certainly not competition law.
DARYL LIM: That's a good point to pause and take as a segue to briefly
talk about the Klobuchar Bill, because I think it also contains provisions which
mirror what you just described, Damien. Let’s let somebody just very quickly
tell us what are the key essentials in the Klobuchar Bill, and then what are the
chances it actually will pass in Congress?
Did you raise your hand to answer that question, Angela, or did you want
to say something else?
ANGELA ZHANG: No, I actually want to weigh in on a few points that
Damien addressed [crosstalk].
DARYL LIM: Just hang on. Let's focus on that question first, and then
we'll come back to Damien.
THOMAS B. NACHBAR: Well, I think, actually, one of the interesting
things about the Klobuchar Bill is what you think the key provisions are depends
on how you read it. It purports to change the standard for mergers under Section
7,19 which would be a pretty significant change from substantially lessening
competition intended to create a monopoly to appreciable risk of materially
lessening competition. I think that's probably the most sort of-- Well, I don't
know. It also adds a new exclusionary conduct defense20 in Section 26a of the
Clayton Act21 as well.
I think it's hard to know what changes like that are going to mean.
Appreciable risk of materially lessening competition seems to me to be a clear
signal to courts to tighten the standard, but also seems to me to be a standard
that's an interpretable standard. The bill relies on a number of presumptions. It
sort of has a love-hate relationship with relevant markets at some level, in that
it in some cases relies more heavily on market definition and presumptions with
regard to market share, and in other places obviates the requirement to engage
in market definition.
It does a lot, and I think that down to right establishing, trying to define
the idea of industrial disruption, which I think is something that we've been
talking about all along. Charlotte's point about quality versus innovation, I'm
not sure there's a quality case that's not about innovation, or really more an
innovation case that's not about quality. I'm not sure how closely or how much
you would distinguish between the two of them. It seems to try to take both to
make some fundamental changes about antitrust, but then also really tries to, in
some cases, be very, very specific in its provisions.
For instance, it basically, I think, tries to overrule the American Express
case22 with regard to the harm that multi-sided market platform providers,
basically, whether or not they have to harm more than one side of the market.
As a result, I've stopped prognosticating about the likelihood that provisions are
19
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going to pass because the only thing that's consistent about that is my
inaccuracy. It does seem to capture a bunch of pretty disparate ideas together,
some of them really quite broad, that I think could prompt some interesting
conversations.
Some of them very specific, and I think that really go to the kinds of
problems that Charlotte and Damien were talking about that are specific to these
providers. You have to wonder whether you're going to see those changes
happen through the antitrust law as this bill would sort of suggest, or if they're
going to happen in other ways. It's not static. If there is more robust privacy
regulation or data regulation, generally I would foresee a lot of the pressure for
these changes to platforms changing, at least with regard to competition law.
Again, I think how you look at the Klobuchar Bill depends a little bit on
what you find in it that's interesting. From my perspective, it really seems to try
to get at some pretty disparate problems, some of them fundamental, and some
of them really quite specific.
DARYL LIM: All right. Thanks, Tom. I'm going to go to Angela and
then after that, I'm going to take one question from the Q and A on data
management. If you want to have a quick look at that, you can have a look at
that while Angela answers. Angela, what was your point?
ANGELA ZHANG: My point is actually a reaction to both Damien,
Tom, and Charlotte. All your points are about competition law. We need some
fundamental changes to competition law. Right now, there's so much
dissatisfaction with it. Some jurisdictions like EU or others are moving towards
a completely different sphere such as increased regulation to deal with this. I
just wonder two things. Instead of thinking about regulation, can we also think
about, for instance, greater international competition?
For instance, in the Facebook example, Facebook did fear the
competition from a Chinese company, ByteDance, which owns TikTok, and
that was deemed a very fierce competitor to Facebook. If there is potential room
for welcoming more, or lowering the barriers of foreign investment and
welcoming more international competition, maybe that would solve some of the
competition issues that are giving us a headache today.
I'm not saying this because I was raised in Hong Kong and I advocate
for China, but I do think that the Chinese tech giants– because if you look
around the world, only the United States and China have fostered tech giants,
and Chinese companies, especially those in the consumer internet businesses
have become fierce competitors. If you let these companies go on the global
stage and compete with the US Big Tech, I don't think it's a clear black and
white situation in which we watch to see which player ultimately wins the
competition scene. I think we need complete out-of-the-box thinking of what
we can do to try to inject more competition into the space here.
On Damien’s point about creating more regulation for Big Tech; I'm just
worried that actually, it might make them even stronger. What doesn't kill them
makes them stronger because they already have deep pockets, they have good
compliance teams, so they can do better than other smaller players.
DARYL LIM: All right. Thanks, Angela. Very quickly, if you want,
Charlotte, do you want to answer [crosstalk] that question from the audience?
Okay, go ahead. Then we'll move on to AI. Go ahead.
CHARLOTTE SLAIMAN: Daryl, I wanted to respond to Angela's last
point about the idea that regulation might make the platform stronger. This is
11
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an argument that I hear a lot in our US discussions. I think it's something that
we should take seriously, but it's not the end of the conversation. There are really
important pro-competition regulations that are really actually targeted at having
the opposite effect. I think there is in the US sometimes a knee-jerk reaction that
any kind of regulation is going to protect monopolies.
The regulations that we are talking about, very similar to what Damien
was talking about in the EU context, are really going to promote competition
and target monopolies that the platforms have and the gatekeeper power that
they have. We're very carefully trying to target them to not have that effect.
Just to respond to the sort of back and forth that Tom and Damien were
having about antitrust and regulation or competition law and competition
policy, I really think it's not an “either/or,” it's a “yes/and.” I think that also
applies there to the next question about privacy. We need both new privacy
laws, we need antitrust reform, and we need these pro-competition regulations.
This is a huge problem, and so we're going to need to use all of these tools to
address that [crosstalk].
DARYL LIM: All right, thanks. Any final thoughts about digital
platforms before we move on to AI?
THIBAULT SCHREPEL: Yes.
DARYL LIM: Yes, Thibault.
THIBAULT SCHREPEL: I agree, but only partially. If you take the
DMA, it’s a good example, it will probably reinforce competition between big
platform and startups if they can access the infrastructure. However, let us say
that I'm Facebook and I want to come up with a new search engine, and to put
a good one in the market will use the data coming from facebook.com. Well, I
cannot do that with the DMA, meaning that it may protect Google’s dominant
position in that market, meaning that the competition between the tech giants
may actually be reduced because of the DMA. I think it's very complex,
especially if you consider all of the different levels within the industry.
DARYL LIM: All right, thank you. Bill?
WILLIAM E. KOVACIC: Daryl, I'm going to try to take up the point
that Tom wisely ducked, which is to predict what's going to happen. I very much
like Tom's description of what the Klobuchar Bill seeks to do, which is to give
a general push to the courts to be more accepting of different theories of liability.
There's going to be a real difficulty for the proponents of legislative change to
decide where their strategy is going to be.
There are some things in the Klobuchar Bill, such as giving the agencies
more money, that probably will command broad support, but if they want to
build the larger coalition, especially to tap the immediate Republican
antagonism towards Big Tech, for reasons dealing more with the filtering and
presentation of use, they're going to have hard choices to make about what to
queue up. At least some of the Republican leadership, such as Congressman
Buck in the House of Representatives, who said, "I'd like a program focused on
tech--" has said a couple of other things. One is, "I don't want a big package that
goes beyond Big Tech," and second, "I don't want to create a new regulatory
apparatus."
I think if we're thinking about the sequencing of measures, I think we
get resources first, we probably take on mergers second, abusive dominance
third, and then a residual discussion about whether to give, say the FTC, rulemaking authority to do more ambitious things. But as you go through that chain,
12
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you come up with a more difficult set of coalition-building exercises in the
Congress. The simple place I think they'll start is give the agencies more money,
and Senator Klobuchar wants to double their budgets.
DARYL LIM: Thanks, Bill. Thibault, I see there's a question that's
directed to you in the Q and A. Do you want to quickly answer that as we
transition to–
THIBAULT SCHREPEL: Sure, and I'll be quick.
DARYL LIM: Go ahead.
THIBAULT SCHREPEL: It relates to your Trinko decision in a sense.
What I was referring to is really much the relationship between Big Tech and
consumers. There we have some studies regarding the choice paradox, where if
you give 50 different options to consumers they will take the first one in front
of them, but if you only reduce that to six, then potentially they may want to
consider the different options. It's just an example proving that less choice might
be good for consumers.
Again, I'm not saying this is always the case, but this is pretty much the
business model of google.com, facebook.com, Instagram. They reduce choice
so that you will only see information that you want supposedly. Of course, it's
not as easy, but that's the idea. When it comes to B2B23 relationships, then
choice reduction, I think, takes a different nature, but then it relates indeed to
Trinko and the duty to help your rivals and so on. This is not what I was referring
to in my comments earlier.
DARYL LIM: Okay. Thanks, Thibault. Now switching gears, but also
in some ways related to what we've been discussing, dealing about innovation,
nascent acquisitions, and so on, is this idea that district court judges, and
sometimes even the agencies themselves, have difficulty being able to quantify
and administer the law because antitrust law has become so complicated.
Now enter artificial intelligence, and the question that many people are
seized with, in particular an outfit at Stanford University which Thibault and
Bill are both involved in, one as an advisory board member and the other one
as the person heading the project, is can artificial intelligence actually help with
antitrust enforcement and analysis? Thibault and Bill, why don't you start us off
and tell us a little bit about this project called Computational Antitrust?
THIBAULT SCHREPEL: Happy to. I'll be very brief. Over the past 10
years, I have been reading lots of papers explaining how AI might be bad for
competition. A few papers explain how it might be useful for competition
sometimes, but it was really much regarding the substance of what AI is doing
on the market. I thought to myself, "What about agencies using AI and, in a
sense, fighting fire with fire?" Although it's a [unintelligible] I don't like, but I
like the analogy. You read very little about that, but then I got in touch with a
few agencies and they were very much interested in that. Here and there they
have a few programs where they try to do it, but it's nothing spectacular for now.
The CMA,24 those have about 50 computer scientists, so I think it's fair to say
it's the world leader, the FTC, the DOJ,25 all moving in that direction as well.
Very small agencies also are investigating the field. The idea of the project is to
bring all of those agencies together, a bunch of academics, no money involved,
whether public or private so it's purely an academic project, and to see where
23
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AI can help. If you take merger control it’s obvious, if you take cartel detection
it's also obvious. If you scrap the market you could do national language
processing to analyze company documents. You could do machine learning on
agencies' own case law. We published a paper where they've done that on the
FTC decision, actually finding that in the pharma markets, when companies
implement one practice, they tend also to implement another one which was
invisible to human eyes.26
There is a potential, there is also a risk. Not everything can be calculated
and computed, and we need to discuss when we have some computable elements
and non-computable elements what do we do? There are rooms for lawyers, but
the idea indeed is to at least put the subject on the table and to see what we can
develop in the field. Indeed, Bill is one of the advisory board member. Maybe,
Bill, the floor is yours if you want to say something.
DARYL LIM: I just also wanted to mention before Bill started that one
of the many hats that Bill wears is also one that's related to the CMA. I'm glad
that you mentioned that so I can recognize Bill's work at the CMA. Bill, just to
tee up the question and perhaps focus it a little bit for you is, you've spent a
lifetime in antitrust law, and presumably, Thibault or somebody from the project
came to you knocking and said, "Hey, we have got this new thing. Would you
serve as a board member?" What went through your mind and what ultimately
convinced you this was something that you wanted to be part of?
WILLIAM E. KOVACIC: I should mention that I don't speak for the
CMA but I certainly am informed by its experience. I think what was, to me, a
brilliant intuition of Thibault's was the recognition that agencies needed much
greater indigenous capacity to do good technical work in this area. Both to do
an accurate diagnosis of what is taking place in these sectors, that is to know
what's going on, to understand the technical developments. Not to understand
them five years later but to understand them as they unfold.
Second, that agencies individually and collectively have something that
might be called big antitrust data. That is, they have large bodies of experience
and knowledge, but it tends to be disaggregated and not always brought
effectively to bear upon the resolution of specific problems. I've certainly seen
at the CMA, which has built an extraordinary capability, that there's an
awareness now inside the House that this is a great asset in running specific
cases, in examining developments, and interpreting those developments.
I think the brilliant feature of Thibault's initiative here was to realize that
not simply was it a matter of individual initiative for specific agencies, but that
if they pool their efforts, discuss techniques, methodologies, learning, that
collectively they can go down the learning curve so much faster than they would
otherwise. Then if they don't do this, they can talk all they want about digital
regulation. All the discussions of the agencies are usually publicly filled with
great assurances about how they're doing precise, careful surgery to deal with
the malignancy but not any of the healthy tissue.
You can talk about that all you want, but if you do not have the team and
the capacity to do that work well it's a fiction, or maybe even dangerous. I'm a
big fan of the initiative.
DARYL LIM: Thanks. Two follow-up questions. One is, how does
somebody–and we'll get to who the somebody is in a moment–go to these
26
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agencies and sell it? What's the value proposition for them? What's in it for
them? Two, who would be that somebody? Are we talking about the FTC, the
DOJ? Are we talking about Thibault and his team or someone else?
WILLIAM E. KOVACIC: I think first and foremost for any initiative, whether
you're deciding whether or not you want pre-merger notification, whether you
want a leniency program, you have to persuade the potential adopter that it will
make their lives better. That's step one. You do that by reference to things you've
already done. I think one of the most effective exponents of that is someone
who's done it. If you're going to buy an automobile, I suspect one thing you
often do is to ask somebody who's already bought one and is using it, and ask,
"What do you think?"
I think the most important sources of discussion, the proponents are
going to be those who've done it, who showed that it worked, and can provide
a bit of know-how about how to do it. One thing that Thibault's initiative does
is to create a forum in which those ideas can be exchanged among authorities.
DARYL LIM: Thanks.
THIBAULT SCHREPEL: I simply wanted to say the agencies will send
us each year a one to two-page report regarding all of the implementation of
competitional tools they've been doing that year, and this will be public. That's
the idea too. I think indeed it's very important even if you were to advise
companies to know what the agency is doing to make sure that procedural
fairness is here. If you don't understand computer science, how can you defend
your clients?
We need to discuss all of that, but I wanted you to say, Daryl, don't you
want to answer the question because you actually discussed that and mentioned
the idea that potentially the FTC would be the better-placed agency, at least in
the US, to actually take AI and try to use it in enforcement. Maybe the floor is
yours.
DARYL LIM: Except that I try to avoid product placement. For those of
you who are curious to see what Thibault is mentioning, I actually contributed
a short paper on the question whether computational antitrust can succeed, 27 but
this is not my time, this is the time for the panel. I'm going to invite the panel to
weigh in to see if they have any thoughts in the last two and a half minutes that
we have.
CHARLOTTE SLAIMAN: I'd just like to highlight Thibault's final
point as he was explaining the idea that we have to be conscious of the nonquantitative measures. I think the history of antitrust that we were talking about
in the beginning, the Consumer Welfare Standard, part of the problem that we're
facing is there are components of the Consumer Welfare Standard that are easier
to quantify, and courts have come to rely more on those.
I'm glad that Thibault is already thinking about this concern, but it's
something that I'd be very concerned about that we have this, perhaps in the
future, very effective great AI that is telling us so much about these quantitative
measures. I wouldn't want the non-quantitative measures that I think are
probably still very important to be left out and not considered as strongly. I'm
glad you're thinking about that and I hope [crosstalk].
DARYL LIM: Thanks, Charlotte. Anyone else? Tom, Damien, Angela?
27
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THOMAS B. NACHBAR: I'll just reiterate something that Charlotte
said. Earlier in the conversation, we were talking about innovation as opposed
to price and output effects, and I think she makes a good point. Some of the
things we didn't talk about, for instance, like the political dimensions of
antitrust, are even further detached from what are readily observable
quantitative factors. One of the views of the Consumer Welfare Standard is that
it's only about price and output. I actually think that that's an oversimplification,
and that actually that idea was reaffirmed by the panel today.
To the extent that that has captured, I think the perception of the
Consumer Welfare Standard as opposed to its practice make these kinds of
efforts a little similar. It'll be really interesting to see what happens because I
also know that computer scientists are incredibly smart about this and that social
scientists are smart, and there are a lot of observable characteristics that don't
represent quantities that are quantifiable. I think it's going to be really
fascinating to see how this field develops, and I'm looking forward to Thibault
and Bill's work in this, and Daryl's. I'm looking forward to the initiative and
people who are working in the area.
DARYL LIM: Thanks, Tom. Okay, we have five seconds left.
WILLIAM E. KOVACIC: Daryl, if I can just provide a bit of assurance
on this. Part of it is to develop mechanisms to simply identify and understand
what you've done in the past in the area of innovation. Maybe on this panel there
are some, but I don't know how many people have studied the case of
Cytyc/Digene at the FTC in the early 2000s, 28 which was almost a pure
innovation case. At the earliest stages of the R&D pipeline, 50 transactions
involving Defense and Aerospace where innovation was front and center.
I don't know how much the agencies have taken on and understood about
the know-how and insights they developed. It's not just about crunching
numbers; it's about bringing to bear the larger experience you've had to solve
the problems you have now. If you can do that you're far better off than trying
to learn it all over again from ground one.
DARYL LIM: Thank you, Bill. Now I think you can see why I thought
that "War and Peace" might be an apt title for this panel. It's just as eternal and
complicated as it is, but thank you for taking us through all of these issues, and
I hope you enjoy the rest of the conference. Thank you.
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